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INTRODUCTION

In recent years, legislatures of all fifty states have considered
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proposals for some type of tort reform.1 This intense scrutiny of
the civil justice system was fueled by stories of huge recoveries
based on previously unheard of causes of action premised on little
or no fault.2 In addition, stories circulated about cancellation and
unavailability of liability insurance coverage for many essential
private and public functions,3 soaring increases in the cost of insurance coverage," and the insurance industry's cry of imminent economic disaster.'
In response to these concerns, some state legislatures have enacted so-called "tort reform" statutes designed to alleviate some of
these problems the public is experiencing. Meanwhile, other
states, such as North Carolina, have been slower to act, adopting
more of a wait and see approach to the problems in order to gain
more insight on how they could best solve them. A few of the reasons some states have been skeptical in jumping on the reform
bandwagon are their basic distrust of the insurance industry's allegations in light of the industry's acknowledged cyclical history, evidence that some of the insurance industry's problems are based on
its own mismanagement, lack of clear proof that the reforms will
alleviate the problems complained of by the industry and society,
and constitutional concerns as to the validity of some of the proposed reform statutes.7
This Comment examines some aspects of the civil justice system in this state, highlights a few of the opposing parties' views on
the need for tort reform in North Carolina, and examines proposed
solutions currently under consideration by the General Assembly.
This Comment will attempt to show that civil justice system reform is not needed in North Carolina and that the legislative enactment of such proposals will prevent proper legal redress for injured residents in this state and require those same residents to
1. Church, Sorry, Your Policy is Cancelled, TIME, March 24, 1986, at 16, 17.
2. See Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 143 Cal. Rptr.
225, 573 P.2d 443 (1978).
3. See generally REPORT OF THE LIABILITY AND PROPERTY INSURANCE MARKETS
STUDY COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA

(1987)

[hereinafter REPORT].

4. Id.
5. Id.
6. For a survey of recent activity by states in the tort reform area, see generally National Law Journal, February 16, 1987.

7. See sources cited infra notes 43, 40, 34, 124, 146, and 147, respectively, for
detailed analysis of these arguments against enactment of tort reform measures.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol10/iss3/3
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subsidize the recoveries of injured parties in other states.
II.

WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE SYSTEM?

When one asks, "what's wrong with the tort system?," the answer depends on to whom the question is directed. Different opposing groups put the blame on each other, and sorting through
the various factions' accusations and finding substantive, reliable
information is difficult at best. A complete understanding and
analysis of all the alleged problems is well beyond the scope of this
paper. However, a summary understanding of the main allegations
is essential in deciding what, if anything, is wrong with the system,
and what should be done to correct the perceived problems. This
section will discuss several of the alleged problems in light of current North Carolina law. The problems discussed are plaintiff-oriented changes in the law, insurance industry business practices, an
overlitigious society, and excessive jury verdicts.
A. Plaintiff-Oriented Changes in the Law
An insurance industry mainstay accusation is that the law has
become too plaintiff-oriented, making its job of predicting risks
and pricing appropriately impossible.' It points to the increased
expansion of liability based on little or no fault, 9 abolition of restrictive privity requirements,"0 and lessened requirements of causation which enable plaintiffs to recover more easily." Its argument is that these liberalized standards have increased the
incentive for plaintiffs to sue and created an unfair tilting of the
scales of justice in the plaintiffs' favor.
Most tort liability expansion in recent years has taken place in
the area of products liability. Strict liability for defective design,
manufacture, and warnings was first applied by the California Su2
preme Court in the case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products.
8. Hearings Before the Liability and Property Insurance Markets Study
Commission, 1985 Session of the North Carolina General Assembly, at 3 [herein-

after Hearings] (statement of Thomas C. Carpenter, General Manager, Commercial Division, Aetna Life and Casualty, Charlotte, North Carolina).
9. Id. See also Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 143 Cal. Rptr.
225, 573 P.2d 443 (19178).

10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment 1 (1965).
11. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132,
607 P.2d 924 (1980).
12. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963).
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1983
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This case became the basis for the premiere products liability statute in the country, the Restatement (Second) section 402A. 3 Section 402A gained rapid popularity and many states adopted it
quickly. This statute is based on a policy assumption that injuries
resulting from unreasonably dangerous defective products are a
cost of doing business to the manufacturer of those products and
that, as between the manufacturer and the injured plaintiff, the
manufacturer is in a far better position to absorb those costs of
injuries sustained from the use of his products. 4 This is due to
manufacturer ability to allocate that cost as an expense of doing
business and insure against it. The definition of section 402A has
lent itself to varying interpretations, especially in defining what is
unreasonably dangerous and what constitutes a defect. 15 As a result, some of the interpretations of section 402A have changed the
statute from a strict liability statute premised on the finding of a
defect to an absolute liability statute requiring only that the plaintiff show injury to recover.1" These later interpretations have
caused many states to voice misgivings about this statute and as a
result its adoption rate has slowed considerably.
When the insurance industry complains about relaxed causation requirements as a cause of their problems, it often points to
the case of Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories.7 This California case
involved a class action suit brought by a group of women who indirectly received the drug diethylstilbesterol (DES). 8 The drug was
supplied to their mothers during pregnancy to prevent miscarriages; however, the drug caused a form of cancer that appeared
after lying dormant and undetected in the daughters for ten to
twelve years.' 9 The trial court dismissed the case because the
plaintiffs could not determine which of the drug companies actually supplied the pills to their mothers for consumption.20 The California Supreme Court reversed the lower court and held that the
defendant manufacturers of DES in operation at the time the
plaintiff class received its treatment could be liable for damages
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment 1 (1965).
14. PROSSER AND KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 98 (5th ed. 1984).
15. Compare Barker, 20 Cal. 3d 413, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443 (1978),
with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 10, at comments g-i.
16. See 20 Cal. 3d 413, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443 (1978).
17. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 607 P.2d 924 (1980).
18. Id. at 593, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133, 607 P.2d at 925.
19. Id. at 593-4, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133, 607 P.2d at 925.
20. Id. at 595-6, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134, 607 P.2d at 926.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol10/iss3/3
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based on each defendant's market share.21 Essentially, the court
waived any requirement that the plaintiffs prove which, if any, of
the defendants were responsible for their injuries. This position,
though limited to certain factual situations, represents a drastic
liberalization of standard causation principles.
The vast majority of states in this country have adopted still
another liberalization of the law, that being some form of comparative negligence. 22 Under a comparative negligence system of recovery, the plaintiff is allowed recovery for his injuries proximately
caused by another negligent party even though he was partially
negligent himself.23 His recovery is merely reduced by a percentage
amount that represents the degree of the plaintiff's negligence.
This is contrasted against the system of contributory negligence,
which totally bars the plaintiff's recovery when his own negligence
even minutely contributes to the injuries he has sustained.24 The
policy consideration behind the comparative negligence system is
that a greater level of fairness can be achieved through apportionment of fault than the harsh recovery-barring effect of contributory negligence.25
The above-cited examples are modern expansions of tort law
recovery and liability. While these new developments have been
taking place in other states, North Carolina has remained one of
the more conservative jurisdictions in its application of tort law.
For example, instead of adopting a strict liability prototype
products liability statute, the General Assembly in 1979 adopted a
products liability statute based on negligence principles. 2" The
statute adheres firmly to the negligence principles handed down in
McPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,27 a landmark products liability
case. The statute also provides for ordinary negligence action defenses such as contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and obvious dangers to act as a complete bar to recovery.28 In addition,
21. Id. at 611-2, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145, 607 P.2d at 937.
22. At the time of this writing roughly ninety percent of the jurisdictions in
this country had passed some form of comparative negligence. The only remaining
contributory negligence states are Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia.
23. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 14, at § 67.
24. Griffin v. Ward, 267 N.C. 296, 148 S.E.2d 133 (1966).
25. Id.

26. N.C.

GEN.

STAT. §

99B (1985).

27. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-4 (1985).
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the statute provides a cause of action for a strictly limited class of
people under the implied warranty of merchantability of the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted in North Carolina.2 9 Subject to
very limited situations, such as a claim for breach of express or
implied warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code as enacted
in North Carolina,"0 which itself may have limited application in
this state, a plaintiff cannot recover for personal injuries in North
Carolina absent a showing of the defendant's fault."' This requirement has inhibited directly the expansion of tort liability experienced in other states.
In addition to the requirement that the plaintiff show fault in
order to recover, North Carolina has retained, despite intense pressure in recent years, the doctrine of contributory negligence.3 2 This
is further evidence of the conservative view this state takes in regard to tort recovery. Moreover, it shows that North Carolina has
taken a common sense approach to tort recovery keeping in mind
the costs of running businesses, manufacturing products, and providing services to its citizens.
Therefore, one must wonder if North Carolina should adopt
the reforms proposed and adopted in other states. An argument
could be made that North Carolina law in its current condition is
more "reform" by itself than has been accomplished through the
implementation of reforms in more plaintiff-oriented jurisdictions.3 3 This also relates closely to an argument adamently supported by the North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers, the
North Carolina Bar Association, and the North Carolina Department of Insurance that the enactment of any tort reforms will have
little effect on liability insurance rates and availability in this state
and, further, will actually. cause the citizens of this state to subsi29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-2(b) (1985).
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-313-314 (1986).
31. Wilson Bros. v. Mobil Oil, 63 N.C. App. 334, 305 S.E.2d 40 (1983) (citing
Maybank v. S.S. Kresge Co., 46 N.C. App. 687, 689, 266 S.E.2d 409, 411 (1980),
modified and aff'd, 302 N.C. 129, 273 S.E.2d 681 (1981)).
32. Comparative negligence bills were introduced into the North Carolina
House of Representatives during the 1987 Session. They were referred to the
House Committee on the Judiciary IV where they currently remain.
33. The bulk of the reforms advocated nationwide do not block currently allowed causes of action but instead attempt to limit relief once judgment is rendered. Current North Carolina tort law fails to recognize some of these causes of
action such as § 402A. Failure of a jurisdiction to recognize a cause of action creates more of a disincentive to bring suit than a limitation on damages once the
plaintiff gets to court.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol10/iss3/3
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dize the recoveries of citizens of more plaintiff-oriented states.34
These groups base their theory on the fact that upon writing a
large policy most insurance companies in effect sell off part of that
policy on the reinsurance market in order to insulate the original
underwriting company from exposure in the event they should
have to pay on the policy.3 5 The key is that most reinsurers who
participate in the reinsurance market are foreign to North Carolina, and the premiums the original underwriter must pay to the
reinsurer to take the risk of purchasing part of their policy are set
not on North Carolina loss rates but on national loss rates.3 6
Hence, there would be little or no reduction in what would be
charged to North Carolina residents on a large liability insurance
policy after these reforms were passed because the improved insurance conditions in North Carolina would have little or no effect on
national reinsurance rates charged by foreign reinsurers.
B. Insurance Industry Business Practices
The insurance industry gives two answers when asked why insurance is so expensive and so scarce. First, it is losing money in
general and, second, it is losing money because of the civil justice
system.37 At the same time, opponents of tort reform argue that
greed and poor business practices are the cause of the insurance
industry problems and that the industry has created a smoke
screen crisis to scare state legislatures into bailing it out.3 8 In addition, they argue that no reforms should be passed until the insurance industry has come forward in an open manner with clear evidence to substantiate its claim of difficult times.3 9 Regardless of
what position is taken, it is clear the insurance industry will be the
primary beneficiary of the proposed changes. Therefore, its practices must be examined closely before the General Assembly enacts
any of the proposed reforms.
34. Hearings, supra note 8 (see generally statements by James C. Fuller,
Chair of the North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers Victims' Rights Committee, the Report of the North Carolina Bar Association Special Committee on the
Tort Liability System, and statements by North Carolina Insurance Commissioner James E. Long).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Hearings, supra note 8, at 3 (statement by North Carolina Attorney General Lacy H. Thornburg).
38. See sources cited supra note 34.
39. Id.
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The North Carolina Department of Insurance points to past
pricing and risk management errors and bad judgment as the root
cause of the insurance industry's current problems. "' Beginning in
the late 1970s and into the early 1980s, the industry began a practice known as cash flow underwriting., 1 This practice was a result
of high interest rates prevalent during that period of time. The
high rates of interest led insurance companies into frenzied competition, which made companies willing to underprice their policies
so they could get access to premium dollars to invest at high rates
of return. The high investment income subsidized the under-priced
premiums and any claims filed. The attractiveness of the market
brought newcomers into the insurance field, which further intensified competition and drove prices down even further.
In the mid-1980s, the interest rates began to fall substantially;
as a result, the insurance industry was left without the anticipated
interest and investment income to subsidize the losses occurring in
certain markets. This resulted in many reinsurers getting out of
those markets entirely, substantially hindering the ability of the
industry to write certain coverage. This loss of the ability to write
these policies is the root cause of insurance shortages.2
In analyzing the property-casualty insurance industry, one
must take into consideration that the industry is extremely cyclical
in nature."3 This most recent cycle has been deeper and more severe than any other in history." As insurance executives observed
the cycle declining in 1984, they saw an opportunity to blame the
rate increases needed to offset the lack of investment income on
runaway juries, a litigation explosion, and a civil justice system
that they claimed was no longer functional.' 5 As a result, the insurance industry began advertising campaigns based on this assumption. These campaigns, unlike others in the past, were successful
due to their timing coinciding with the raising of rates and shrinking coverage.
In analyzing the industry's economic performance, one should
understand that the industry plays with a stacked deck of cards.
40. Hearings,supra note 8, at 3-4 (statements by North Carolina Insurance
Commissioner James E. Long made Oct. 22, 1985).
41. Id. at 3.
42. Id. at 4.
43. Burrow and Collins, Insurance Crisis - Texas Style: The Case for Insurance Reform, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 759, 761 (1987).
44. Id.
45. Id.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol10/iss3/3
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For example, under the McCarron-Ferguson Act," the insurance
industry is exempt from anti-trust laws. This is based on the idea
that the states would regulate through the rate-making process. 7
This has not always happened and leaves insurance companies free
to allocate markets among themselves, choosing to write in some
states and not write in others, thereby eliminating competition.
Another advantage is the industry's use of "underwriting
losses."48 This term relates to the number of dollars the industry
predicts will be paid out in future claims. However, the key is that,
when the insurance industry determines underwriting losses, it
never accounts for the income made from the investment of premium money. Like banks and other financial institutions, the insurance industry deals in money. It brings it in as premiums and
pays it out as losses, which gives the industry a tremendous
amount of money to invest. But none of this investment income is
considered in the rate-making process. 4 9 Also, the money set aside
as losses in the reserve fund earns substantial interest which is exempt from federal taxation. In other words, loss in insurance terms
does not coincide with the traditional meaning of the term.
By increasing or inflating predicted claims, the industry can
further itself two ways. First, it pays less taxes as this predicted
underwriting loss is offset against current income. Second, it can
use its predicted losses to justify premium increases.5 °
In the years leading up to the so-called crisis, insurance profits
have been extremely high. In 1980, the industry's profits were
$7.73 billion; in 1981, the profits were $6.96 billion; in 1982, the
profits were $4.62 billion; and in 1983, the profits were $2.65 billion. 1 In 1984, the industry claimed a loss of $3.82 billion. 52 However, A.M. Best Company's Aggregates and Averages for 1733
property/casualty companies showed that when actual losses paid
and underwriting expenses were deducted from premiums written
plus net income and tax credits, the -overall profit was $8.6
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1982).
47. Hearings,supra note 8, at 1 (statements by representatives of the North
Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Hearings, supra note 8, at 14 (statement made by James C. Fuller, Jr.,
Chair of the Academy's Victims' Rights Committee).
52. Id.
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billion.5 3
Even if one takes the insurance industry's figures at face
value, it had an overall profit of $18 billion for the five-year period
from 1980 through 1984. That performance is not bad considering
the type of management policies, such as cash flow underwriting,
which were in place at the time. Furthermore, it is significant that
the industry's surplus, essentially its net worth, increased from
$52.2 billion in 1982 to $76 billion at the end of 1985. 5. This was
the same time the industry was supposedly in such dire economic
straits. Also, these figures for surplus do not include the money set
aside as underwriting losses, earning tax free income.
Finally, if anybody should know and understand the insurance
industry's economic status, it is Wall Street. In 1985 alone, property and casualty insurance stocks rose by almost fifty percent,
twice the general market rise. 5 Additionally, from 1980 to 1985,
the property and casualty industry's stocks increased one hundred
ninety-four percent versus an eighty-four percent Dow Jones Index
increase.5 6 These are not the signs of an industry on the brink of
economic disaster.
Before the General Assembly adopts any of the reform measures, regulators should inspect insurance practices and business
methods to be sure that any so-called crisis is indeed a real one,
and not some mirage set up by an insurance industry to make up
for lost profits due to poor business practices. Specifically, regulators should increase the pressure to require the industry to produce figures reflecting their North Carolina loss experience. Otherwise, North Carolina residents have no assurance that the reforms
will cure the current problems.
C.

Society Has Become Overlitigious

One of the problems most often cited by tort reform proponents is that society has become overlitigious5 While it may be
true that more lawsuits are being filed nationally, many of these
lawsuits are non-tortious. When one looks at this state's figures, it
becomes clear that there is no merit to the claim that North Caro53. Hearings, supra note 8, at 3 (statement made by James Maxwell, President-Elect of the North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers).
54. See sources cited supra note 51.
55. See sources cited supra note 37, at 5.
56. Id.
57. See REPORT, supra note 3, at 28-30.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol10/iss3/3
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lina is caught up in a lawsuit frenzy.5
In North Carolina, there has been virtually no increase in litigation per capita from 1975 through 1985. 51 On the contrary, since
1982 the litigation rate has actually decreased." Admittedly, plaintiffs have filed more lawsuits, but this increase is in almost direct
correlation to the increase in population North Carolina has enjoyed in recent years."1
This increase in population sets off a chain of events that actually aids the insurance industry. A larger population base results
in an increase in the number of people who need insurance. This in
turn creates a larger customer base, more premiums, more money
to invest, more investment income, and a greater capacity to pay
claims. The result is that the insurance industry enjoys the benefits of population growth the same as any other customer-oriented
business. So while plaintiffs may be filing more lawsuits, the evidence in North Carolina shows that there is no glut of litigation in
terms of per capita lawsuits.
D. Excessive Jury Verdicts
As noted earlier, the North Carolina law is very conservative
as it relates to the recovery for personal injuries.2 The laws are
conservative because they are created and administered by legislators and judges elected by the citizens of this state who mirror the
ideas and values of those who elect them. These same citizens who
elect state officials are the people who, when asked to do their civic
duty, act as jurors in the courts of this state. North Carolina juries
are noted as being conservative but fair, recognizing true injury
but also being quick to spot a nonmeritorious claim. In a sense,
proponents of tort reform are telling the North Carolina legislators
that those citizens who elect them to carry out and implement
their conservative ideas are not fit to act as triers of fact who measure the damages inflicted upon their fellow citizens.
Reform proponents' complaints of runaway juries and excessive verdicts are the center of the reform movement. 3 As part of
58. Id.
59. Information provided by the North Carolina Administrative Office of the
Courts, Report of Civil Litigation of the Superior Court, 1975 to 1984-85.
60. Id.

61. Id.
62. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
63. See Hearings, supra note 8, at 8.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1983
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an effort to raise money and inflame the public, the American Tort
Reform Association (ATRA) recently sent out a letter to the publiC.6 4 In it the Association cited what it believed to be evidence of
its claim that juries must be limited in the amounts they can
award. 5 However, the Association failed to tell all the facts exactly
as they happened, conveniently omitting important aspects of the
cases. Below is a summary of the cases the ATRA cited in their
letter.
1. ATRA Version - A Pennsylvania woman was
awarded one million dollars in damages after claiming a
CAT scan destroyed her psychic powers.
True Facts - The woman was a spiritual advisor by trade
and her claim was actually based on an allergic reaction to a
pre-scan injection. The jury verdict was based on pain and
suffering (economic damages had been withdrawn earlier by
the judge). The judge set aside the verdict because it was
excessive and because the jury failed to follow his instructions. The case will be retried. 6
2. ATRA Version - A burglar fell through a skylight
during a robbery. He was awarded $206,000 and $1,500 a
month for the rest of his life.
True Facts - There was no jury award because the case
was settled. The plaintiff was a teenager who climbed on
the roof of the school to take a floodlight. The skylight was
painted over and the fall rendered him a quadraplegic. A
student at another school had died in a similar accident at
another school eight months earlier and school officials had
already contracted to board over the skylights to solve the
maintenance and safety problem. 7
3. ATRA Version - In California, a drunk driver lost
control of his car and crashed into a telephone booth, injuring a man in the booth. The man sued the phone company
and others and the California Supreme Court said they
were all liable.
64.
65.
66.
67.

National Law Journal, Feb. 16, 1987, at p. 39, col. 1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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True Facts - The unanimous court merely ruled that the
plaintiff was entitled to a jury decision on the issue of liability and remanded the case for trial. The liability of the
phone company was based on the fact that the plaintiff saw
the car coming but could not get out of the phone booth
due to a door malfunction or improper maintenance, which
caused him to stand idly by waiting to be struck. The case
was settled before trial."
4. ATRA Version - In New York, a man had both his
legs severed while trying to commit suicide by throwing
himself in front of a subway train. He sued and was
awarded $850,000.
True Facts - There was no jury award, because in reality
the case was settled. The plaintiff was mentally ill and his
lawyers alleged the motorman had ample time to stop. A
knowledgeable source stated the case was settled before
trial in order to avoid release of derogatory information
about the motorman. 9
These cases are examples of what often happens. Facts are
twisted and stories grow bigger than life. North Carolina, as of
1986, had awarded verdicts in excess rf one million dollars only
fourteen times in its history - all a result of catastrophic injuries.70 In a state that requires liability based on fault and that is
known for conservative jury awards, it seems unlikely that we as a
state are responsible for few, if any, of the insurance industry's alleged problems with excessive jury awards. In fact, evidence shows
that by reducing our verdicts in this state through caps on damages, we will be asking the citizens of this state to subsidize the
recoveries of plaintiffs in other states.7 1
III.

REFORM STUDIES IN NORTH CAROLINA

As a result of increased pressure from North Carolina residents concerning the availability and cost of insurance, the 1985
Session of the General Assembly created the Liability and Property Insurance Markets Study Commission. 7' The areas of study of
68. Id.

69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
See source cited supra note 51, at 12.
See source cited supra note 34.
Ch. 792, § 8.1, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws.
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this commission were set out as follows:
1. The availability of professional and commercial liability
and property insurance in this state and factors causing and
compounding diminutions in underwriting capacity.
2. The underwriting and marketing practices of admitted
and non-admitted liability and property insurers and producers doing business within this state.3. Optional methods of Risk Management and risk sharing
that may be utilized by the citizens of this state.
4. The effect of diminished underwriting capacity in professional and commercial liability and property insurance on
the economy of this state.
5. Any other subjects deemed by the Commission to be rele73
vant to this study.
This enabling legislation authorized a commission membership of
twelve people allowing the Speaker of the House, the President of
Senate, and the Commissioner of Insurance to appoint four members each.7 4
The Commission held its first meeting on October 22, 1985. 7 5
At this meeting, plans were made for a series of public hearings
around the state. These hearings were held in late 1985 and allowed the public to make presentations about their concerns relative to the commission's purposes. 76 The Commission asked the insurance industry to provide high-ranking spokespersons from
several insurance companies who could answer Commission questions about their views on the problems being studied by the Commission. A regional manager from one company was present to
77
speak on the insurance industry's behalf.
In the meantime, during February of 1986, the General Assembly, which Commissioner of Insurance James E. Long had
urged to convene, held a special session. It considered giving him
stand-by authority to compel the insurance industry to provide unavailable but critically needed coverage. The legislature passed
such a bill in a one-day special session. 78
The Commission recognized that the bill passed during the
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Ch. 792, § 8.2, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws.
Id.
See REPORT, supra note 3, at 57.
Id. at 58.
Id.
Id. at 59.
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special session was designed to alleviate insurance availability
problems and not those of affordability and extent of coverage.
Therefore, the Commission divided into sub-committees, one to
concentrate on civil justice system modifications and the other to
concentrate on insurance regulation. 79 After its consideration of evidence obtained at public hearings as well as other sources, it synthesized its data and drafted a single bill containing both civil justice system modifications and insurance regulation measures."0
Senator Harold Hardison introduced the proposed legislation
into the Senate.8 1 After a month of legislative shuffling and modifications, the Senate Insurance Committee ultimately reported the
bill unfavorably with several exceptions. The favorable exceptions
allowed several liability insurance regulations and a provision enacting Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as part of
the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure." These portions were
8
incorporated into another bill and ratified. After the Commission's failure to pass the substantial portion
of its measures in the 1986 Session, it reconvened in late 1986 to
consider its future work.84 It heard several presentations from various groups and decided to continue meeting. However, the Commission decided to narrow the scope of its work to concentrate on
civil justice modifications.8 5 Early 1987 brought several more meetings with additional presentations and more discussion of what legislature proposals to recommend to the 1987 Session. Finally, the
Commission chose six topics and arranged for the preparation of
draft legislation on all six of the topics.8 6 The six topics included:
(1) a more stringent standard of proof for recovery of punitive
damages; (2) required payment of part of any punitive damage recovery to the state General Fund; (3) development of a tort claims
act for political subdivisions; (4) modification of joint and several
liability; (5) modification of the collateral source rule; and (6) caps
on non-economic damages.8 7
The Commission completed and approved the draft legisla79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

69-70.
70.
71.
72.

at 73-4.
at 74.
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tion. 8 On May 4, 1987, Senator Harold Hardison introduced legislation on each of the six topics.8 9
IV.

TORT REFORM PROPOSALS NOW BEFORE THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY

As a result of its studies, the Liability and Property Insurance
Markets Commission recommended that six proposals for civil justice modification be introduced before the 1987 Session of the
North Carolina General Assembly.9 0 On May 4, 1987, these bills
were introduced into the Senate as follows:
1. Senate Bill 826 - A Bill to be entitled "An Act to Create a
Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act."
2. Senate Bill 827 - A Bill to be entitled "An Act to Change the
Standard of Proof for the Award of Punitive Damages and to
Eliminate Punitive Damages Based on Vicarious Liability."
3. Senate Bill 828 - A Bill to be entitled "An Act to Modify the
Collateral Source Rule."
4. Senate Bill 842 - A Bill to be entitled "An Act to Regulate the
Award of Punitive Damages in Civil Cases and Provide for Itemized Verdicts."
5. Senate Bill 843 - A Bill to be entitled "An Act to modify Joint
and Several Liability so that a Defendant is Liable only to the
Degree he was Responsible for the Damage Suffered by the
Plaintiff."
6. Senate Bill 844 - A Bill to be entitled "An Act to Limit the
Amount of Damages for Non-Economic Losses in Civil Cases to
$250,000 and to Provide for Itemized Verdicts."9'
At present, the Senate Judiciary Committee II is considering
this legislation, except for Senate Bill 827, which failed its second
reading.9 2 A summary and criticism of each of the proposals
follows.
88. Id. at 75.
89. Information provided by the Legislative Services Office of the North Carolina General Assembly. For detailed analysis, see sources cited infra notes 90144.
90. See REPORT, supra note 3, at 75.
91. See supra note 89.
92. Id.
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This bill is the Commission's response to North Carolina cities
and towns' complaints of the extreme difficulty in obtaining affordable liability insurance for their activities. The bill is founded in
hopes that a decrease in the liability exposure of such communities
will induce the insurance industry to lower the premiums it requires each town to pay for its liability coverage.
This may seem to be a logical conclusion but, while the insurance industry has called for reforms exactly like this proposed bill,
it has made no promises that enactment of this type of legislation
will accomplish the intended result of reducing premiums. On the
contrary, other jurisdictions that have enacted this type of reform
are still experiencing the same problems of high cost and unavailability of insurance that we are now experiencing.9 In fact, the only
thing about this bill of which we can be sure is that enactment will
cause North Carolina citizens to forego their rights of redress for
injuries suffered due to the negligence of political subdivisions.
This bill would require a complainant against a political subdivision to file its case in the superior court of the county where
the political subdivision is located."' The bill would require a complainant to allege that the political subdivision was responsible for
injuries arising out of an "act of negligence." 9 5 This would appear
to require a positive act of negligence and preclude recovery for
passive negligence allowed under the state tort claims act.", In addition, there is a 180-day notice requirement that the plaintiff
must fulfill as a condition precedent before an action can be filed
against a political subdivision or one of its employees. 7
Perhaps the most important part of this bill is the damages
provision. Damages are limited to $100,000 for all claimants cumulatively for injury or damage to any one person unless the political
subdivision has purchased liability insurance coverage in excess of
that amount."
93. See source cited supra note 51, at 7.
94. S.B. 826, 1987 Session, North Carolina General Assembly.
95. Id. at p. 2.
96. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291 (1987) was amended July 1, 1979, to provide
recovery for the passive, in addition to active, negligence of a state employee acting within the scope of his employment. Prior to that date active negligence was
required to create a cause of action. This bill appears to adopt a standard requiring a negligent act.
97. See S.B. 826, supra note 94, at p. 2.
98. Id.
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The bill imposes a two-year statute of limitations for claims
against a political subdivision measured from the time that the
claim arose.9 9 Additionally, the limitations on the claims section
provides that no claims from certain governmental functions arise
when performed directly by the political subdivision, but these
claims are allowed when private contractors carry out these same
governmental functions on behalf of political subdivisions. 1°0 The
political subdivision would be immune from suit when performing
directly the following functions:
1. making and enforcing ordinances;
2. preventing crime and operation of a police force;
3. preserving the public health;
4. fire prevention, suppression, and operation of a volunteer fire
department;
5. providing services to the poor;
6. educational services;
7. animal control;
8. control and regulation of bus companies;
9. discharge of public employees;
10. maintenance of airports;
11. operation and maintenance of libraries;
12. installation and maintenance of traffic signal lights;
13. installation and maintenance of systems providing electricity
for street lighting;
14. operation and maintenance of parks (where non-city income
for their operation and maintenance is incidental);
15. garbage disposal (where the service is operated on a nonprofit
basis);
16. any duties imposed on a political subdivision by statute;
17. any other actions or functions in exercise of police power, or
judicial, discretionary, or legislative authority, conferred by their
charters or by statute, or when discharging a duty imposed solely
for the public benefit. 10 1
The bill also includes a provision completely barring a plaintiffs
claim for punitive damages against a political subdivision.10 2
Furthermore, the bill provides for settlement of claims. A political subdivision would be allowed to settle any claim, except that
of a minor, without that claim being filed in superior court, as long
99. Id. at p. 3.
100. Id.
101. Id. at pp. 3-4.
102. Id. at p. 4.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol10/iss3/3

18

19881

Marshall: The Battle at Little Big Horn Has Moved to Raleigh - Is This Cust

N.C.

TORT REFORM

as the settlement amount was $25,000 or less. 0 3 The superior court
would be required to approve settlements in excess of that
amount. 04 In case of an appeal of any judgment, such appeal
would act as a supersedeas and no monies would be required to be
05
paid until a court finally determined all issues.1
This bill would hamper severely an injured party's right to recover from a political subdivision covered by this legislation. The
net result would be that, as to the vast majority of government
functions, the plaintiff would have no available right to redress for
injuries due to the political subdivision's negligence. The bill has
admirable intentions, specifically encouraging affordable insurance
coverage for political subdivisions through decreased exposure.
However, there are at least two negative aspects as well. First, it
denies redress to parties' legitimate claims of injuries proximately
caused by a political subdivision's negligent act during certain
functions performed by them. Second, the bill creates a disincentive for political subdivisions to use ordinary care while performing
their duties because there will be little or no chance that the political subdivision will come to bear the cost of their negligence. Until
the General Assembly is provided with concrete evidence that this
bill will accomplish the intended purpose of lowering the cost of
premiums to local communities, the General Assembly should not
pass this bill.
B. Senate Bill 827 - Modifications in the Standard of Proof for
the Award of Punitive Damages
North Carolina law currently provides that punitive damages
may be awarded when a defendant is guilty of an intentional act,
gross negligence, or willful and wanton conduct. 0 6 This proposed
bill would change the plaintiff's burden of proof requirements in
seeking punitive damages. The bill would require that the alleged
conduct giving rise to a punitive damage claim be proved by a new
standard of clear and convincing evidence.10 7 In addition, this bill
would eliminate punitive damage awards based on a defendant's
vicarious liability, typically the liability of an employer or other
103.
104.
105.
106.
598, 606,
107.

Id. at p. 3.
Id.
Id.
East Coast Development Corp. v. Alderman-250 Corp., 30 N.C. App.
228 S.E.2d 72, 78-9 (1976).
S.B. 827, 1987 Session, North Carolina General Assembly.
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master under the doctrine of respondeat superior.108
The bill's primary purpose is to make the rare award of punitive damages even rarer. As with other reforms, this bill would create a disincentive for potential defendants to maintain proper
standards of care in their operations. Punitive damages are
awarded as punishment for a defendant's acts and to deter other
potential defendants in like situations from participating in similar
conduct.'0 9 With increased standards of proof, awards become
more infrequent, which decreases their deterrent effect. Punitive
damages work in the same manner as the hanging sword of Damocles - their value is that they hang as a threat over the heads of
potential defendants.
It is common knowledge that many business decisions are
made not out of concern for human lives and injuries but in terms
of how much the loss of lives and injuries will cost the business in
money damages. 1 When the threat of punitive damages is lessened, so is the dollar amount for the cost of loss of lives and injuries used in the business's balancing equation. The result is less
care in the decisions involving human lives and more emphasis on
profitable but perhaps risky products.
It is significant that this bill or one similar may have a dismal
future. Senate Bill 827 failed its second reading on May 15, 1987,
soon after it was introduced.
C.

Senate Bill 828 - Modification of the CollateralSource Rule

The collateral source rule excludes evidence of compensation
the plaintiff receives from a wholly independent source as a result
of the injury the defendant inflicted."' Such payments are not deducted from the damages that the plaintiff is otherwise entitled to
108. Id.
109. Cavin's, Inc. v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 27 N.C. App. 698, 701-02, 220
S.E.2d 403, 406 (1975).
110. A good example is the Ford Pinto cases. To save about $10.00 per vehicle, Ford management decided to avoid a design alternative that would have eliminated a problem in the fuel system; as a result, the cars exploded when rearended. Notes of these meetings were introduced into evidence by the plaintiff
against Ford. The jury in one case was so outraged that it awarded almost three
million dollars in compensatory damages and $125 million in punitive damages.
The trial court remitted the damages to $2.5 million in compensatory damages
and $3.5 million in punitive damages, which was affirmed. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981).
111. Fisher v. Thompson, 50 N.C. App. 724, 731, 275 S.E.2d 507, 513 (1981).
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receive from the tortfeasor. In other words, a defendant tortfeasor
is afforded no benefit because the plaintiff has received money
from other sources due to injuries the defendant inflicted on the
plaintiff. The rule often comes into play in two situations: when
the plaintiff's own health insurance policy pays him benefits, or
when the plaintiff is gratuitiously paid a percentage of his wages
during his recovery period for injuries the defendant caused. Current North Carolina law would prohibit reduction of the plaintiff's
recovery due to the plaintiff's receipt of these payments." 2
Significant policy considerations create the basis for this rule.
First, the rule prohibits tortfeasors from benefitting from prudent
measures the plaintiff has undertaken and for which he has paid.
Second, the rule encourages society to undertake these prudent
measures to properly provide for society as a whole and for individual families' financial and health needs. Finally, the plaintiff
has paid for these benefits, most often insurance, either by
purchasing insurance himself or by accepting lesser wages for his
employment. These concessions by the plaintiff allow his employer
to procure insurance for him. The most common complaint about
the rule is that the plaintiff somehow receives double recovery for
the same injury, which results in a windfall.'13 However, that is not
the result. On the contrary, what the plaintiff receives is not a
double recovery but a partial reimbursement for past premiums
paid to procure the collateral source.""
This bill would modify the current collateral source rule by
allowing the trier of fact to consider information about all payments from collateral sources that have been made or are available
to the plaintiff.1 5 The bill further provides for evidence of setoff,
subrogation, and subsequent rights to be introduced as an explanation of the collateral payments." 6
This bill would make the jury's already difficult job even more
difficult. More importantly, the bill directly violates North Carolina's pronounced public policy which encourages citizens to plan
and provide for their future financial needs by purchasing
insurance.
This bill would penalize most those citizens wise and prudent
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
See source cited supra note 51, at 7.
Id. at 8.
S.B. 828, 1987 Session, North Carolina General Assembly.
Id.
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enough to provide for their family's needs.11 7 These people, in effect, would spend their premium dollars and receive no corresponding economic benefit. The bill benefits those people who fail
to plan ahead and purchase insurance, as they would receive the
same benefits as those who purchased insurance without paying insurance premiums." 8 The bill would also benefit the negligent
party and his insurance company as they would no longer have to
compensate the plaintiff fully even though they are responsible for
the plaintiff's injuries." 9
This bill directly violates North Carolina's public policy of encouraging citizens to provide for their own financial security. The
Senate Judiciary Committee II should expose this bill for what it
really is and make certain that it does not become the law in North
Carolina.
D. Senate Bill 842 - Regulation of Punitive Damage Awards
Through Itemized Verdicts
This bill is designed to regulate punitive damage awards to
injured claimants through increased disclosure. 2 0 It contains two
parts. The first part regulates the awards themselves while the second part provides for award disclosure to make the regulation
possible. 2
Part one of this bill would require that forty percent of the
punitive damage award be payable to the claimant, while sixty percent of the punitive damage award would be payable to the State's
General Fund.1 22 Part two of this bill would require the trier of
fact to itemize the plaintiff's total award into an amount representing compensatory damages and an amount representing punitive
damages.' 2 3
The bill's purpose is to make punitive damage awards more
difficult to obtain and smaller if any are obtained. Arguably, this
legislation is better than other states' measures that completely
eliminate punitive damage awards because the total damage award
must still be paid by the defendant. However, the bill would still
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

See source cited supra note 51, at 8-9.
Id. at 9.
Id.
S.B. 842, 1987 Session, North Carolina General Assembly.
Id.
Id.
Id. at pp. 1-2.
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reduce the plaintiff's punitive damage award by sixty percent and
would require that amount to be paid into the State's General
Fund. Such a bill is clearly suspect constitutionally and if enacted
would result in an almost certain challenge.1 24 The bill's net effect
is to create revenue for this state through its citizens' injuries.
The bill's itemization provision merely creates a conduit
through which the state can appropriate the plaintiff's recovery.
Further, it creates a method for the court to examine clearly how
the jury's total verdict is apportioned.
This bill clearly deprives injured parties' rights to recover for
injuries inflicted upon them by a tortfeasor's gross negligence, intentional acts, or willful and wanton conduct. The legislature
should not further limit North Carolina residents' already limited
rights by enacting such arbitrary legislation.12 5
E.

Senate Bill 843 - Modification of Joint and Several Liability

The doctrine of joint and several liability enables an injured
plaintiff to recover from one tortfeasor the entire judgment
amount rendered against multiple tortfeasors.'2 s Each defendant is
liable for the judgment's entire amount both individually and as a
group.1 27 The doctrine enables the plaintiff to obtain full recovery
through one lawsuit and puts the burden on the defendants to obtain contribution from one another. The doctrine's purpose is to
facilitate the injured plaintiff's recovery and is premised on a policy that the defendants, not the plaintiff, should bear the burden
of apportioning liability since they caused the plaintiff's injuries.
This bill would modify this doctrine substantially by abolishing the doctrine entirely as to tortfeasors whose individual degrees
of negligence are found to be no greater than twenty-five percent. 28 Additionally, it would abolish the doctrine entirely as to
noneconomic damages.' 2 The doctrine would be retained only as
to economic damages and would be applied only to tortfeasors
whose degrees of negligence are greater than twenty-five percent.'
124.
125.
126.
363, 311
(1958).
127.
128.
129.
130.

U.S. CONST. AMEND. V.
See supra notes 26-31.
Pryse v. Strickland Lumber and Bldg. Supply Inc., 66 N.C. App. 361,
S.E.2d 598, 600 (1984); Bell v. Lacey, 248 N.C. 703, 104 S.E.2d 833
Id.
S.B. 843, 1987 Session, North Carolina General Assembly.
Id.
Id.
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To administer this change, the court would direct the trier of
fact to use special itemized verdicts to apportion fault among the
defendants. 131 The defendants will retain the right to implead all
joint tortfeasors so that all the defendants' liability can be determined simultaneously. 1 32 Further, the bill states clearly that it in
no way modifies North Carolina's doctrine of contributory
negligence. 33
Joint and several liability is an essential part of this state's
civil justice system. It allows the plaintiff to avoid the consequences of an insolvent joint tortfeasor and quite fairly places on
the defendants the responsibility of pro rata fault apportionment.
The abolishment of joint and several liability as described in this
bill places the burden of recovery apportionment on the plaintiff.
At the very least, this bill should be modified to provide for fault
reallocation in the event of an insolvent defendant so the plaintiff
is assured full recovery.
F. Senate Bill 844 - Limitation of Damages for Noneconomic
Losses in Civil Cases to $250,000
This bill's purpose is to limit an injured party's recovery for
intangible injuries for which no definite monetary amount can be
fixed. This type of injury includes pain and suffering, loss of consortium, mental anguish, loss of capacity for enjoyment of life, and
emotional distress. This bill would put a $250,000 cap on these and
other nonpecuniary damages that cannot be proven to have a specific economic value.13 4 The jury would not be told of the limitation prior to their deliberations. They would be instructed to itemize damages on special verdicts into categories for economic losses,
noneconomic losses, and punitive damages.' 33
North Carolina is a conservative state made up of conservative
people who perform jury functions. There is no substantial evidence to support a claim of problems with runaway juries in this
state. 36 In fact, high verdicts have been extremely rare in North
Carolina's legal history.1 37 Trial judges in this state have inherent
131. Id. at p. 2.
132. Id.
133. Id. at p. 1.

134.
135.
136.
137.

S.B. 844, 1987 Session, North Carolina General Assembly.
Id. at pp. 1-2.
See source cited supra note 51, at 11-2.
Id. at 12.
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authority to set aside verdicts that are clearly excessive or unduly
influenced by prejudice." 8 Experience has shown they have
responsibly used this authority. Caps, as proposed by this bill, are
extremely arbitrary and unfair to injured parties.
Critics argue that it is impossible for a jury to determine
responsibly the amount of noneconomic damages that should be
awarded in a particular case. 39 However, our legal system constantly places problems far more complex than determination of
damages in the jury's hands. Very few jurors understand the intricacies of corporate law, securities law, or taxation, but we have and
will continue to allow juries to decide the facts of these cases. For
centuries, our system has placed its full faith in the jury's hands.
Two years of self-induced insurance industry management
problems should not change a system based on centuries of
experience.
More importantly, there is little evidence that caps will make
liability insurance more affordable or available, which are the bill's
intended results.'"" If caps are put into place, insurance companies
have not promised that they will lower premiums and offer more
insurance. In the mid-1970s there were claims that caps were
needed to help the medical malpractice crisis, which caused many
states to put caps on damages into law. Those states are now having the same problems with medical malpractice insurance as those
states that did not enact such caps. Virginia acted early with tort
reforms, including caps, and for some time was considered the
model state and pioneer in tort reform.' 4 ' Now, it too is having the
same problems as other states with liability insurance cost and
availability and has organized a study commission similar to our
42
own to examine the problems.'
Should jury verdicts actually be reduced in some cases, it is
unlikely these reduced verdicts will have any impact on the cost of
premiums in North Carolina.1 43 When an insurance company
writes a large policy, a substantial portion of this risk is resold on
the reinsurance market to other companies to spread the risk of
loss on that policy. 14 4 The large portion of these companies is for138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

N.C. GEN.

See

STAT. §

REPORT,

1A-1, Rule 59 (1983).

supra note 3, at 26-7.

See source cited supra note 34.
See supra note 51, at p. 7.
Id.
See supra note 34.
Id.
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eign and the premiums for reinsurance are based on national loss
experience rather than loss experience of the state in which the
policy was written. The result is that any savings realized by limiting recoveries in this state will not reduce premium costs to North
Carolina customers. Instead, the limited recoveries will be used to
subsidize the recoveries of residents in other states.14 5 This is exactly why the insurance industry has not promised reduced premiums in North Carolina should these caps be passed into law.
In addition, caps on noneconomic damages have drawn constitutional objections both at the federal and state level.14 Arguments have been made that caps violate due process, equal protection, and open court provisions in state constitutions similar to a
1 7
provision contained in North Carolina's Constitution.
The General Assembly should push for increased disclosure
and regulation of the insurance industry rather than adopt caps on
noneconomic damages. North Carolina residents deserve better
than the current closed mouth attitude of the insurance industry.
V.

CONCLUSION

North Carolina has acted fairly and conservatively in developing its current civil justice system. We have retained appropriately
many common law traditions of tort law, taking great pains to
steer clear of the liberal plaintiff-oriented changes in the law enacted by some states, both legislatively and judicially. Our judges
and legislators have maintained a common sense approach to tort
recovery that requires that fault be shown to recover damages for
an injured plaintiff, keeping in check the sympathy they may have
for an injured party while always being mindful of the practical
costs and realities of potential defendants who provide products
and services to North Carolina residents.
Our rewards for maintaining such a legal system have been
few lately, especially in light of the insurance industry's recent
business practices. Our businesses and manufacturers, especially
those smaller companies so prevalent in North Carolina, have been
especially hard hit by the high cost and unavailability of liability
insurance. Our restraint in development of the North Carolina civil
145. Id.
146. Note, The Constitutionality of Florida'sCap on Noneconomic Damages
in the Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986, 39 U. FLA. L.R. 157, 164, 168
(1987).
147. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 18.
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justice system has been ignored by the insurance industry as it factors in national loss experience into its pricing process rather than
recognizing the North Carolina residents' common sense and conservative nature.
The issue of tort reform may be much different in California
or New York or Florida. However, the General Assembly is responsible not for those states but only for North Carolina. North Carolina's residents are not the cause of the insurance industry's alleged problems. In fact, North Carolina residents are one reason
the problems are no worse than they are. North Carolina residents
should not have to subsidize recoveries of residents in other states;
on the contrary, we should be rewarded for providing a favorable
environment for the insurance industry to conduct their business.
The General Assembly should require increased disclosure and regulation of the insurance industry, specifically regarding its recent
performance in North Carolina, before enacting these proposed
tort reforms. The legislature cannot solve the problems in other
states' legal systems nor should it try. It can, however, protect the
limited rights of North Carolina citizens by insuring that this state
does not end up making unnecessary sacrifices that are the responsibility of other states, not our own.

John P. Marshall
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